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Decreases Mere Choice Effect
Zhe Shang, Tuoxin Tao and Lei Wang*
Department of Psychology and Beijing Key Laboratory of Behavior and Mental Health, Peking University, Beijing, China
Choice effect is a robust phenomenon in which even “mere choice” that does not include
actual choosing actions could result in more preference for the self-chosen objects
over other-chosen objects. In the current research, we proposed that autonomy would
impact the mere choice effect. We conducted two studies to examine the hypothesis.
The results showed that the mere choice effect measured by Implicit Association Test
(IAT) significantly decreased for participants with lower levels of trait autonomy (Study 1)
and when participants were primed to experience autonomy deprivation (Study 2). The
theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
People make choices according to their preferences, indicating the important role that preferences
play in choices. In addition, choice also has an impact on post-choice preferences. After the choice
has been made, people’s liking of the chosen objects tends to increase while that of the rejected
objects tends to decrease, known as the post-decisional spreading of alternatives (Brehm, 1956;
Hammock and Brehm, 1966). In other words, people would prefer one of two similar objects simply
because they chose one rather than the other, which is also known as the choice effect (Huang et al.,
2009). Since the initial work of Brehm (1956), this phenomenon has got widespread attention
(Ariely and Norton, 2008). The choice-induced preference has been found to exist strongly in
several forms, such as in real choice actions (Patall et al., 2008) and illusory choices (Huang et al.,
2009).
Over the past decades, the cognitive dissonance theory and self-concept related theories have
been widely used in explaining the mechanism underlying the choice-induced preferences. The
main classical explanation is based on the cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), which
argues that people are motivated to maintain internal consistency between cognitive inputs and
behavioral outputs to reduce the uncomfortable feeling of dissonance. An individual is likely to
experience cognitive dissonance if he/she holds negative attitudes toward an object, given that the
object has been chosen by oneself, because thus a conflict would occur between the cognitive input
(“I don’t like this thing”) and the behavioral output (“I chose this thing”) (Van Overwalle and
Jordens, 2002). In order to reduce this uncomfortable feeling of cognitive dissonance, individuals
would increase their liking of the chosen objects when the actual choice action has been taken
(Olson and Stone, 2005). This theory helps to explain why people prefer a chosen object to an
unchosen one simply because they took an explicit action to choose the object. However, when
there is no explicit choosing action, the cognitive dissonance theory loses its power in explaining
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the mechanism of the choice-induced preference. Recent
empirical research has indicated that the choice effect happens
even when individuals lack the awareness of their choosing
behaviors (Lieberman et al., 2001; Coppin et al., 2010), suggesting
that cognitive dissonance may not be a necessary prerequisite of
choice-induced preference. Indeed, choice-induced preferences
are found even when the choices were seemingly trivial (Langer
and Rodin, 1976) or wholly illusory (Langer, 1975). That is,
choice-induced preferences existed even when there was no
explicit choice action and thus the awareness of cognitive
dissonance may not be present. The phenomenon where choice
itself is powerful enough to induce liking, even in the condition
that choosing is illusory and does not actually occur, was termed
by Huang et al. (2009) as the mere choice effect.
The theory referring to the positive valence of self node helps
to explain the choice effect as well (Greenwald et al., 2002).
“Self node” means that self was treated as a node in the self-
related concept tree. “Self ” is the sum of all that one can call
his/her own (James, 1890). “My choice” is also a part of the self-
concept. Theories and phenomena associated with self-serving
or self-protecting biases (Sedikides and Strube, 1997), such as
self-enhancement (Kurman, 2001), self-affirmation (Brown and
Dutton, 1995), and self-verification (Chen et al., 2006) imply that
people are prone to evaluate “my choice” as better than “others’
choice” to maintain a positive self-image, and thus would display
a positive evaluation on self-chosen objects. “Self node” affects the
choice-preference link by increasing preference on self-chosen
objects in an implicitly way, which leads to mere choice effect.
On the other hand, to choose is to express a preference and
to assert the self (Leotti et al., 2010). Consequently, attaching
a high evaluation to “my choice” implies acceptance of the
self and thus in turn brings higher self-satisfaction and self-
esteem. The scope of self-concept is broader than just one’s
possessions or decisions (choices). As the Ryan and Deci
(2000) theorized self-determination theory (SDT), the need for
competence, autonomy, and psychological relatedness are three
psychological needs that motivate the self to initiate behavior
(Deci and Ryan, 1985, 2000). The act of self-regulation, such as
autonomy, is also related to self-concept. Experiencing autonomy
promotes the sense that an individual’s behavior is self-motivated
and self-determined and thus maintain a positive self-image.
Applied in the objects evaluation, another possible theoretical
explanation refers to the role that autonomy plays in the choice
effect.
The sense of autonomy refers to the extent to which people
feel free to make their own decisions and experience a sense of
volition in their actions (van Prooijen, 2009). Choosing behavior
increases the experience of autonomy by allowing people to
exert their right to make a decision. Previous research has
demonstrated that people evaluate the chosen alternative as
more desirable than the rejected alternative, in order to reassert
their autonomy (Hammock and Brehm, 1966). Experiments
have suggested that manipulations designed to enhance one’s
experience of autonomy can boost intrinsic motivation and
energize behavior (Swann and Pittman, 1977; Zuckerman et al.,
1978; Simon and McCarthy, 1982, Unpublished). Offering
people an optimal amount of choice enhanced their intrinsic
motivation and energy to persist (e.g., deCharms, 1968; Deci
and Ryan, 1985). As demonstrated by plenty of research,
autonomy is associated with intrinsic motivation (Deci et al.,
1999), persistence (Moller et al., 2006), goal attainment (Sheldon
and Elliot, 1998), and creativity (Sheldon, 1995), indicating
that autonomy elicits positive outcomes. Additionally, perceived
autonomy has an effect on enhancing happiness (Chekola, 2007;
Demir et al., 2011), job satisfaction, and a general increase in
subjective well-being (Sheldon et al., 2004), all of which conclude
that autonomy elicits positive personal feelings. Preference for an
object represents the positive objective valence that one attaches
to the object in the process of evaluation. As has been validated by
previous research, personal positive state and feelings influence
evaluation, in terms of increasing personal preference/sensitivity
on surroundings and targeted objects (Gu et al., 2010; Yang
et al., 2014). It is possible that the sense of autonomy elicited
by choosing enhances an individual’s evaluation toward an
object, because experiencing autonomy induces positive feelings,
which in turn have a positive effect on the evaluation of the
object.
We speculate that the experience of autonomy may enhance
the preference on self-chosen objects. Thus, we measured the
relationship of trait autonomy and choice effect in Study 1
and propose the hypothesis: (1) trait autonomy is positively
correlated with choice effect. We infer that autonomy may
moderate the choice-preference link. When an individual takes
a choosing action or is simply acknowledged that something
has been chosen by himself/herself, the sense of autonomy is
generated, which brings him/her positive feelings. These positive
feelings in turn may enhance his/her positive evaluation to the
surroundings. On the contrary, the lack of autonomy may reduce
the preference for self-chosen objects. To our best knowledge,
however, no study has provided empirical evidence for the role
of autonomy in the choice effect. In Study 2, we investigated
the influence of different levels of autonomy experience on the
choice effect by using a priming task to set three conditions:
the autonomy fulfillment condition, the autonomy deprivation
condition, and the control condition. Here we propose the
hypothesis: (2) the choice effect would occur in the autonomy
fulfillment condition and in the control condition, but not in the
autonomy deprivation; (3) autonomy deprivation would decrease
or even eliminate the choice effect when compared with the
autonomy fulfillment condition; (4) autonomy deprivation would
decrease or even eliminate the choice effect when compared
with the control condition; (5) autonomy fulfillment would
increase the choice effect when compared with the control
condition.
Overview of Two Studies
In order to study the influence of autonomy on the choice effect
while excluding the impact of cognitive dissonance, we employed
a modified illusory choice paradigm, adapted from Huang et al.
(2009) to measure the presence of the mere choice effect. We
adopted the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald et al.,
1998) that records the response time when participants respond
to settled categories of objects framed by positive or negative
adjectives.
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In measuring autonomy, we treated it as an individual
difference variable (Deci and Ryan, 2000). It can be either
dispositional or situational. Thus, we tested our hypothesis
through two studies. In Study 1, we recorded participants’ self-
report trait autonomy and divided participants into high and
low autonomy groups accordingly. Study 2 adopted a priming
paradigm to manipulate the situational autonomy in three
levels.
STUDY 1: THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN TRAIT AUTONOMY
(BETWEEN-SUBJECT VARIABLE) AND
THE MERE CHOICE EFFECT
In Study 1, we used a scale to measure trait autonomy as an
individual differential variable. Subsequently, we tested the mere
choice effect using an IAT paradigm. We then calculated the
relationship of trait autonomy and the mere choice effect.
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 91 graduate and undergraduate students (50 female,
41 male, average age = 22.2 years, SD = 2.39, ranging from 19
to 25 years old) participated in the experiment for a cash reward
(US$2). We asked all the participants to conduct an object chosen
task in which they would see some texts in a computer screen and
react by push some buttons on the keyboard. Each of them wrote
informed written consent before the test. They were told there
would be no any dangers while they were doing the experiment.
They were told their rights and they can decide to or not to
participate in this experiment, and they had the right to quit
the experiment at any time of the experiment. This study was in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by
the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, Peking
University.
Procedure and Materials
Participants were told that there were two unrelated tasks. After
each experiment session, we asked the participant whether he/she
thought the two parts were related. None of them replied yes.
In the first task, they were required to complete questionnaires
including trait autonomy and demographic survey. The second
task was a mere choice task presented on computer, adapted from
Huang et al. (2009), which created a mere choice situation to
the participants. As previous research has demonstrated (Huang
et al., 2009), when participants are asked to choose something for
a third party, they would implicitly prefer the self-chosen object
to the other-chosen objects (i.e., the choice effect).
Trait Autonomy
The five-item Choicefullness Subscale of the Self Determination
Scale (Sheldon, 1995; Sheldon et al., 1996) was used to measure
trait autonomy. Each item presented participants with two
opposing statements. Participants were asked to indicate which
of the two statements was more appropriate for describing
themselves. An example item is showed as follows: “I always feel
like I choose the things I do” (Statement A) versus “I sometimes
feel that it’s not really me choosing the things I do” (Statement
B) (5-likert scale: 1 = only A feels true; 5 = only B feels true).
The answers were coded such that lower scores indicated lower
level of autonomy. Our data showed good internal consistency
(Cronbach’s α= 0.697)
Mere Choice Effect
To evaluate the mere choice effect (an affect reflected the degree
of preference on self-chosen objects over other-chosen objects),
both of the two studies used a modified illusory choice paradigm
developed by Huang et al. (2009), in which participants were
asked to imagine a scenario about choice instead of taking an
actual choice action.
This part was completed on computers using the Inquisit
laboratory software.
In Step 1, participants read the following two-page scenario on
the computer screen:
Please visualize the following scenario. You and your friend
(marked as the other in the experiment) bought six products in a
supermarket for another friend: a mug, a small figurine, a piece
of chocolate, a piece of candy, a pen, and a ruler. Please visualize
and remember these products. They will be used in the following
experiment (Page 1).
Among these six products, three of them were chosen by you,
and the other three were chosen by the friend (the other) shopping
with you. You chose the mug, the chocolate, and the pen. Your
friend chose the small figurine, the candy, and the ruler. Please
spend 2 min to visualize and separately remember your choices and
your friend’s choices. They will be used in the following experiment
(Page 2).
Half of the participants were shown the aforementioned
scenario. The other half read similar instructions except that we
swapped the products assigned to the self and the other.
Then the participants began the modified illusory choice
IAT (Huang et al., 2009). This IAT followed the procedure
designed by Greenwald et al. (1998), involving two target
categories (objects chosen by the self vs. objects chosen by
the other) and two attribute categories (positive vs. negative).
Target categories followed the scenario described previously.
The attribute categories were previously used in many studies
(Maison et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2009). The positive
stimuli included the Sun, luck, love, fun, happiness, pleasure,
holiday, and friendship. The negative stimuli included disease,
death, murder, accident, poison, war, tragedy, and vomit. Our
study was consistent with the classical IAT paradigm (Lane
et al., 2007), target words and attribute words were presented
together in the IAT paradigm. In the two main tasks of IAT,
there were two situations: in one situation, the words “self-
chosen objects/positive attributes” appeared in the top left-
hand corner while the words “other-chosen objects/negative
attributes” appeared in the top right-hand corner; in the other
situation, the words “self-chosen objects/negative attributes”
appeared in the top left-hand corner while the words “other-
chosen objects/positive attributes” appeared in the top right-
hand corner. As can be seen, in both situations, the self-
chosen and other-chosen objects appeared together as the
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target words, making it impossible to analyze their effects
separately.
The IAT consisted of five classification tasks (see Table 1):
attribute discrimination task (Block 1, 24 trials), initial target-
category discrimination task (Block 2, 24 trials), initial combined
task (Block 3, 24 trials for practice, and Block 4, 48 trials for data
collection), reversed target-category discrimination task (Block 5,
48 trials), reversed combined task (Block 6, 24 trials for practice
and Block 7, 48 trials for data collection).
In the attribute discrimination task (Block 1, 24 trials),
participants were asked to press a left key (F) when a positive
word appeared on the screen and a right key (J) for a negative
word. Similarly, in the initial target-category discrimination task
(Block 2, 24 trials), objects chosen by the self (responding by
pressing the left key) and objects chosen by the other (responding
by pressing the right key) were discriminated. In the initial
combined task (Block 3, 24 trials for practice and Block 4, 48 trials
for data collection), attribute and target discrimination trials were
combined and participants had to press the left key when either
a positive word or an object chosen by the self was presented
and the right key when a negative word or an object chosen by
the other was presented (the compatible condition, we replicated
the IAT paradigm in accordance with a previous study (Huang
et al., 2009), in which the participants’ responses showed that
self-chosen objects were implicitly linked with positive words
(e.g., happiness, sunshine), as opposed to negative words (e.g.,
death, war), and in which other-chosen objects were implicitly
linked to negative words, as opposed to positive words. Thus, we
argue that the compatible condition was composed of self-chosen
objects with positive descriptions and other-chosen objects with
negative descriptions, just as Huang et al., 2009 showed). In the
reversed target-category discrimination task (Block 5, 48 trials),
Block 2 was repeated with a switch of the categorization keys by
pressing left key when an object chosen by the other appeared
on the screen and a right key when an object chosen by the
self appeared. The reversed combined task (Block 6, 24 trials
for practice and Block 7, 48 trials for data collection) again
combined two individual tasks. Participants were instructed to
press the left key when either a positive word or an object
chosen by the other was presented and press the right key
when a negative word or an object chosen by the self was
presented (incompatible condition). Each block started with a
brief instruction for the following task and a request to respond
as fast as possible while trying to minimize mistakes. Participants
were also reminded that their error rate and response times would
be recorded.
Different random orders of trails were used for different
participants. Half of the participants went through the seven
blocks in the order presented previously; to remove any order
effect, Blocks 2, 3, and 4 were swapped with Blocks 5, 6, and
7 for the other half of the participants. Only data from Blocks
4 and 7 were used for analysis. Each block started with a brief
instruction.
After each experiment session, the participant was fully
debriefed, thanked, and paid for his/her participation.
Results
We analyzed the data following the processes suggested by
Greenwald et al. (1998). The first two trials of each block were
excluded since the response latencies for them were typically
longer. Next, we recoded the latencies by excluding reaction times
(RTs) that were below 300 ms or above 3000 ms, so that we could
control for outlying trials where distraction and anticipation
likely affected the trial. We disregarded any participant with an
error rate above 30%. Thus, our final data analysis included
87 participants (46 female, 41 male, average age = 21.1 years,
SD= 2.36, ranging from 18 to 25 years old).
In the IAT task, the compatible condition was composed
of self-chosen objects with positive descriptions and other-
chosen objects with negative descriptions, while the incompatible
condition was composed of self-chosen objects with negative
descriptions and other-chosen objects with positive descriptions.
The choicer-attitude valence compatible level (the compatible
condition and the incompatible condition) was a within-subject
variable. We conducted a one-way repeated ANOVA of choice-
attitude valence compatibility level (compatible condition vs.
incompatible condition), after controlling for gender and age.
Results showed a significant main effect, F(1,86) = 4.023,
p< 0.05, η2 = 0.046. Participants’ RT in the compatible condition
(MRT = 753 ms, SD = 206 ms) was faster than that in the
incompatible condition (MRT = 882 ms, SD = 214 ms). We
suggest that participants preferred the self-chosen objects with
positive descriptions and other-chosen objects with negative
descriptions over other-chosen objects with positive descriptions
and self-chosen objects with negative descriptions. In other
words, compared with perceived other-chosen objects, perceived
TABLE 1 | Task process of the IAT paradigm in Studies 1 and 2.
Response key assignment
Block Task Trials Left key Right key
1 Attribution discrimination 24 Positive Negative
2 Initial target discrimination 24 Objects chosen by the self Objects chosen by the other
3 Initial combined task 24 Positive; objects chosen by the self Negative; objects chosen by the other
4 Initial combined task 48 Positive; objects chosen by the self Negative; objects chosen by the other
5 Reversed target discrimination 48 Objects chosen by the other Objects chosen by the self
6 Reversed combined task 24 Positive; objects chosen by the other Negative; objects chosen by the self
7 Reversed combined task 48 Positive; objects chosen by the other Negative; objects chosen by the self
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self-chosen objects were more strongly associated with positive
than with negative words, indicating that people implicitly
preferred self-chosen objects to other-chosen objects, despite
their lack of actual experience of a choosing process, namely the
mere choice effect. This result is consistent with the previous
study of Huang et al. (2009).
Choice Effect and Autonomy
We used the difference response time (d-RT). It is the RT
in the incompatible condition (other-chosen objects that were
implicitly linked with positive words and self-chosen objects that
were implicitly linked with negative words) minus the RT in the
compatible condition (self-chosen objects that were implicitly
linked with positive words and other-chosen objects that were
implicitly linked with negative words) as the indicator of the
choice effect (Mean different RT = 129 ms, SD = 174 ms).
Longer d-RT indicated a larger choice effect while shorter d-RT
indicated a smaller choice effect. In the meantime, lower scorers
on the five-item Choicefulness Subscale of the Self Determination
Scale indicated lower level of trait autonomy, and higher scores
indicated higher level of trait autonomy. The mean score of trait
autonomy was 14.78, and standard deviation was 3.289.
Hypothesis 1 proposed that trait autonomy is positively
correlated with choice effect. We examined the effect of trait
autonomy on choice effect by controlling for gender and age in
a hierarchical analysis. We conducted a hierarchical regression
analysis by entering gender in a first block/model, age in a second
block/model, and the trait autonomy as the independent variable
in a third block/model. All variables were normalized as Z-scores
for data analysis. The regression coefficients, standard error, 95%
confidence interval [CI], the change in F statistic (including
p-value), and the coefficient of determination change (delta R2)
for each model are shown in Table 2. The results of regression
analysis showed that after controlling for gender and age, the β of
trait autonomy on choice effect represented by d-RT in the IAT
task was 0.341, (SE = 0.105, p < 0.01, 95% confidence interval
[CI] = [0.132, 0.551]), which suggested a significant direct
effect. Table 2 shows that trait autonomy explained incremental
variance of d-RT in IAT (11.1%), p< 0.01, suggesting that people
with a higher level of trait autonomy showed a larger choice effect.
It should be noted that only the effect of trait autonomy on choice
effect was obtained; the other two variables (gender, age) were not
significant predictors of the criteria. This above-mentioned result
provides support for Hypothesis 1.
STUDY 2: THE INFLUENCE OF
AUTONOMY ON THE CHOICE EFFECT
Study 2 is designed to extend the results of Study 1. According
to the findings in Study 1, there is a positive correlation between
trait autonomy and the choice effect. To further investigate the
nature of this relationship, we examined whether the choice effect
would remain when autonomy was deprived in a between-subject
design. We aimed to test whether experimentally manipulated
autonomy affects the choice effect. We repeated the steps of
Study 1, except that we did not measure trait autonomy by
questionnaire but manipulated the level of autonomy. In this
study, the perceived autonomy was manipulated by a priming
task, which comprised: an autonomy fulfillment condition, an
autonomy deprivation recall condition, and a control condition.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Sixty-five participants (38 women, 27 men; Mage = 22.3,
SD = 1.9, range from 18 to 27 years old), all of them
were university students. They were randomly assigned to the
three experimental conditions. Twenty-two participants were
assigned in the autonomy-fulfillment condition, 21 participants
were assigned in the autonomy-deprived condition, and 21
participants were assigned in the control condition. All the
participants were informed of conducting an object chosen task
during the recruitment and before the experiment. Informed
written consent was obtained from each participant before the
test. They were told there would be no any dangers while they
were doing the experiment in which they would see some texts
in a computer screen and react by push some buttons on the
keyboard. They were told their rights and they can decide to or
not to participate in this experiment, and they had the right to
quit the experiment at any time of the experiment. They were
TABLE 2 | The hierarchical regression of predictors on choice effect in Study 1.
Predictor The d-RT in IAT
95% CI (Confidence interval) R R2 1R2 F p β SE p
Model 1 0.105 0.011 0.011 0.945 0.334
Gender [−0.110, 0.319] 0.105 0.108 0.334
Model 2 0.111 0.012 0.001 0.121 0.729
Gender [−0.108, 0.325] 0.109 0.109 0.332
Age [−0.254, 0.179] −0.038 0.109 0.729
Model 3 0.351 0.123 0.111∗∗ 10.501∗∗ 0.002
Gender [−0.129, 0.284] 0.078 0.104 0.456
Age [−0.313, 0.106] −0.104 0.105 0.327
Trait autonomy [0.132, 0.551] 0.341∗∗ 0.105 0.002
N = 87. ∗∗p < 0.01.
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rewarded for about 2 US dollars for their participation. This
study was in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and
was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of
Psychology, Peking University.
Procedure and Materials
Participants were told that the session consisted of two separate
tasks. The first task was introduced as focusing on the recall
of past events, while the real purpose of it was to prime the
sense of autonomy in participants. For example, participants
in the autonomy fulfillment condition were asked to write an
essay about a particular incident in which they felt high level of
autonomy. The introduction went as follows:
Manipulating Materials of Autonomy Experience
Autonomy-fulfillment condition
“The first part of this session is story collection. Please describe an
event about personal autonomy. Here, the autonomy is defined as
when an individual is able to make their own choices freely, and
experiences a sense of control over their decisions. (If you have any
questions about this definition, please ask the experimenter.)
Now, please write down an event based on your real experience,
in which your autonomy was satisfied. Please elaborate the details
as much as possible, including the objective circumstances and your
subjective feelings.”
Autonomy-deprivation condition
“The first part of this session is story collection. Please describe an
event about personal autonomy. Here, the autonomy is defined as
when an individual is able to make their own choices freely, and
experiences a sense of control over their decisions. (If any questions
about this definition, please ask the experimenter.)
Now, please write down an event based on your real experience,
in which your autonomy was deprived. That is to say, your
behaviors were not completely controlled by yourself and some
decisions were not self-decided. Please elaborate the details as
much as possible, including the objective circumstances and your
subjective feelings.”
After completing the recall task, participants completed the
Choicefulness subscale of the Self Determination Scale (Sheldon,
1995; Sheldon et al., 1996), as a manipulation check of the
autonomy priming. For the participants in the control condition,
they were given no priming materials and completed the scale
directly. Then, all the participants were introduced to what
ostensibly was a second task: the IAT task, which was the same
task as in Study 1. At last, participants were fully debriefed,
thanked, and paid for their participation.
Results
After applying the same data protocol used in Study 1, the final
data analysis of Study 2 included 64 participants (37 women, 27
men; Mage = 21.7, SD= 1.95, range from 18 to 26 years old).
Manipulation Checks
For the manipulation check of autonomy priming, a one-
way ANOVA revealed that there was a significant main
effect of the autonomy manipulation (the autonomy fulfillment
condition, the autonomy deprivation condition, the control
condition) on the Choicefulness Scale scores, F(2,61) = 3.190,
p = 0.048, η2 = 0.044. After controlling for gender and age,
the ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference
of Choicefulness Scale scores between the autonomy fulfillment
condition (M = 16.86, SD = 2.624) and the control condition
(M = 15.67, SD= 2.850), F(1,42)= 2.012, p= 0.164, η2 = 0.048.
While participants scored significantly higher (M = 15.67,
SD = 2.850) on the Choicefulness Scale in the control condition
than in the autonomy deprivation condition (M = 14.71,
SD= 2.918), F(1,41)= 1.109, p= 0.299, η2 = 0.028. Participants
scored significantly higher (M = 16.86, SD = 2.624) in the
autonomy fulfillment condition than those in the autonomy
deprivation condition (M = 14.71, SD= 2.918), F(1,42)= 6.194,
p = 0.017, η2 = 0.137. This result confirmed the validity of
autonomy manipulation in autonomy fulfillment condition and
autonomy deprivation condition. That is, compared with those
in autonomy deprivation condition, participants in autonomy
fulfillment condition experienced a higher level of autonomy (see
Table 3).
Autonomy and the Choice Effect
To further identify how autonomy affects RT in compatible
condition and incompatible condition, we analyzed a 3
(autonomy priming manipulation: the autonomy fulfillment
condition, the control condition, and the autonomy deprivation
condition) by 2 (choice-attitude valence compatibility level:
the compatible condition and the incompatible condition)
mixed design, in which the autonomy priming manipulation
was a between-subject variable and the choice-attitude valence
compatible level was a within-subject variable. A two-way
repeated ANOVA of autonomy priming manipulation and
choicer-attitude valence compatible on response time was
TABLE 3 | Autonomy scores in autonomy priming task’s manipulation
check in Study 2.
N Mean scores SD
Autonomy fulfillment 22 16.86 2.62
Control condition 21 15.67 2.85
Autonomy deprivation 21 14.71 2.92
FIGURE 1 | Reaction time of compatible and incompatible evaluation
conditions under the autonomy fulfillment, autonomy deprivation, and
control condition in Study 2.
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conducted, controlling for gender and age (see Figure 1). The
results showed a main effect: autonomy priming manipulation
was significant, F(2,61) = 5.341, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.15. The
response time in the autonomy fulfillment group (MRT = 892 ms,
SD = 45 ms) was significantly longer than that in the control
group (MRT = 713 ms, SD = 46 ms), F(1,42) = 7.406, p = 0.01,
η2 = 0.155. The response time in the autonomy deprivation
group (MRT = 906 ms, SD= 46 ms) was also significantly longer
than that in the control group (MRT = 713 ms, SD = 46 ms),
F(1,41) = 8.477, p = 0.006, η2 = 0.174. The response time in
the autonomy deprivation group (MRT = 906 ms, SD = 46 ms)
was not significantly longer than that in the autonomy fulfillment
group (MRT = 892 ms, SD = 46 ms), F(1,42) = 0.142, p = 0.709,
η2 = 0.003. These results indicated that autonomy priming
(whether fulfillment or deprivation) led to slower participant
RTs. A main effect of choice-attitude valence compatibility
level on response time was significant, F(1,61) = 11.877,
p = 0.001, η2 = 0.15. The response time of incompatible trials
(M = 882 ms, SD = 28 ms) was significantly longer than that
of compatible trials (M = 793 ms, SD = 28 ms), indicating
the conflict of objects and adjectives in the incompatible
condition.
The interaction of priming manipulation and compatibility
level was significant, F(2,61) = 4.550, p = 0.015, η2 = 0.11,
indicating that the response time was modulated by the priming
manipulation. Post hoc analyses showed that, in the autonomy
fulfillment condition, participants responded significantly faster
in compatible condition (M = 819 ms, SD = 237 ms) than
in the incompatible condition (M = 964 ms, SD = 216 ms),
F(1,21)= 6.004, p= 0.024, η2 = 0.219, indicating the existence of
the mere choice effect. For participants in the control condition,
they responded significantly faster in the compatible condition
(M = 663 ms, SD = 189 ms) than in the incompatible condition
(M = 766 ms, SD = 251 ms), F(1,20) = 8.787, p = 0.008,
η2 = 0.255, which also indicates the presence of the mere
choice effect. These two findings demonstrated that participants
preferred the self-chosen objects with positive descriptions (e.g.,
happiness, sunshine) and other-chosen objects with negative
descriptions (e.g., death, war) over other-chosen objects with
positive descriptions and self-chosen objects with negative
descriptions. People implicitly preferred self-chosen objects to
other-chosen objects even without owning those objects. The
mere choice effect occurs, even without actually experiencing a
choosing process.
For participants in the autonomy deprivation condition, their
RT in the compatible condition (M = 897 ms, SD = 259 ms)
was not significantly different from that in the incompatible
condition (M = 915 ms, SD = 198 ms), F(1,20) = 2.111,
p = 0.163, η2 = 0.086, suggesting no mere choice effect.
Here, the effect did not occur because there was no significant
difference between compatible condition and the incompatible
condition. The reference point is the participants’ RT in the
compatible condition, and we compare this reference RT with
RT in the incompatible condition. The choice effect appeared in
the autonomy fulfillment condition and the control condition,
but not in the autonomy deprivation condition. The result is
consistent with our Hypothesis 2.
We also used the difference response time (d-RT) as the
indicator of the choice effect. The longer d-RT represents the
larger choice effect. We conducted a one-way ANOVA of priming
perceived autonomy on choice effect indicated by d-RT in the IAT
task, controlling for gender and age. As hypothesized, the main
effect of perceived autonomy was significant, F(2,61) = 4.550,
p= 0.015, η2 = 0.11.
We conducted the planned contrasts. By setting contrast
coefficients, we can not only compare two means at once, but
also combine multiple means from different levels to compute
mean pair tests in these contrasts. Planned contrasts revealed that
priming autonomy fulfillment (Md−RT = 145 ms, SD = 165 ms)
significantly increased the choice effect compared to priming
autonomy deprivation (Md−RT = 18 ms, SD = 170 ms),
t(61) = 2.698, p = 0.009, d = 0.843, indicating a significantly
larger choice effect in the autonomy fulfillment condition than in
the autonomy deprivation condition. Compared with autonomy
fulfillment, autonomy deprivation decreased the choice effect.
This result is consistent with Hypothesis 3. Participants primed in
the control group (Md−RT = 103 ms, SD= 123 ms) did not have a
significantly larger choice effect compared to participants primed
with autonomy deprivation (Md−RT = 18 ms, SD = 170 ms),
t(61) = 1.785, p = 0.075, d = 0.564, the trend did not
reach significance. Here, we did not find supporting evidence
for Hypothesis 4, which proposed that autonomy deprivation
would decrease the choice effect when compared with the
control condition. Participants primed with autonomy fulfillment
(Md−RT = 145 ms, SD = 165 ms) did not show a significantly
larger choice effect compared to participants in the control
group (Md−RT = 103 ms, SD = 123 ms), t(61) = 0.892,
p = 0.376, d = 0.279; the trend did not reach significance.
Among the above effect sizes, the first one (i.e., the choice
effect in the perceived autonomy fulfillment group compared
to the autonomy deprivation group) is a fairly large effect.
For Hypothesis 5, which stated that autonomy fulfillment
would increase the choice effect when compared with the
control condition, we neither found statistical support (see
Table 4).
Similar to the data analysis procedure in Study 1, we
examined the effect of autonomy priming on choice effect
(indicated by the d-RT) in a regression model after controlling
for gender and age. We entered gender in a first block/model,
age in a second block/model, and the autonomy priming
(score 3 represented autonomy fulfillment, score 2 represented
control group, score 1 represented autonomy deprivation) as
the independent variable in a third block/model. All variables
were normalized as Z-scores for data analysis. The regression
coefficients, standard error, 95% confidence interval [CI], the
change in F statistic (including p value), and the coefficient of
TABLE 4 | The d-RT in IAT in autonomy priming conditions in Study 2.
N Mean d-RT (ms) SD (ms)
Autonomy fulfillment 22 145 165
Control condition 21 103 123
Autonomy deprivation 21 18 170
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determination change (delta R2) for each model are shown in
Table 5. The results of regression analysis showed that after
controlling for gender and age, the β of autonomy priming
on choice effect represented by d-RT in the IAT task was.330,
(SE = 0.116, p < 0.01, 95% confidence interval [CI] = [0.097,
0.563]), which suggested a significant direct effect. Table 5
shows that autonomy priming explained incremental variance
of d-RT in IAT (10.8%), p = 0.006, suggesting that participants
with autonomy fulfillment showed a larger choice effect and
supporting Hypothesis 2 (see Table 5).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
By using a modified illusory choice paradigm (adapted from
Huang et al., 2009) to measure the mere choice effect the current
research examined how autonomy would affect the choice effect
even when the actual choice did not occur. Replicating the
previous findings (Huang et al., 2009), the perceived choice,
without involving a real choosing process, has also been found to
enhance the attractiveness of an object in a autonomy-sufficient
condition (Studies 1 and 2), which is termed as the choice effect.
The sense of autonomy was measured not only as a trait by using
questionnaire (Study 1), but also as a state by setting a priming
task of recall writing (Study 2).
Our hypothesis that autonomy increases the choice effect was
supported both when autonomy was measured as an individual-
difference variable (Study 1) and when it was experimentally
manipulated (Study 2). In Study 1, the level of trait autonomy
was positively related with the choice effect. In Study 2, when
state autonomy was enhanced, participants displayed a larger
choice effect. When primed by the autonomy fulfillment recalling
task, participants rated their chosen objects as more favorably
than the objects chosen by others. That is to say, the choice
effect occurred after one’s state autonomy had been induced (see
Study 2, in the autonomy fulfillment condition). Consistent with
previous findings (Huang et al., 2009), we also found that the
choice effect appeared without any autonomy related treatment
(see Study 2, in the control condition). Interestingly, the choice
effect disappeared when participants were primed with state
autonomy deprivation (see Study 2, in the autonomy deprivation
condition). The two studies suggested that autonomy fulfillment
is the premise of the choice effect, such that if people experience
autonomy deprivation, their choice-induced preference would
decrease or would even disappear.
Choice-induced preference has been a topic of longstanding
interest in social psychology (Brehm, 1956; Steele, 1988;
Lieberman et al., 2001; Gawronski et al., 2007; Huang et al.,
2009; Egan et al., 2010). In the objects evaluation IAT task of the
current study, the choice effect holds that people have a more
positive attitude toward an object merely because they perceive
choice of it. The perceived choice itself is sufficient to induce such
effect. This evidence supports that choices influence preferences
through a natural and automatic process, and the choice-induced
preference is a byproduct of the choice (Leotti et al., 2010).
The occurrence of the mere choice effect is possibly related
to the many aspects of the self-concept, such as self-serving
or self-protecting biases (e.g., Sedikides and Strube, 1997), self-
enhancement (e.g., Kurman, 2001), self-affirmation (e.g., Brown
and Dutton, 1995), and self-verification (e.g., Chen et al., 2006).
According to self-enhancement theory, people over evaluate self-
related issues to maintain a positive self-image (e.g., Kurman,
2001). As “my choice” is a part of the self-concept, the positive
words that describe the self-chosen objects represent the positive
valence of self node (Greenwald et al., 2002). People experience
the more positively self-image in choice effect, due to that “my
choice” is given positive postchoice ratings. Faced with the need
to maintain a positive self-image, participants would evaluate the
“self-chosen” objects over the “non-self-chosen” objects, and that
would result in the choice effect.
The most intriguing and main finding in the current study
is that this choice effect was affected by the sense of autonomy.
As showed in the results, a lager choice effect was elicited in the
participants that experienced state autonomy fulfillment rather
than in those with no priming treatment, but the trend did not
reach a significant level. In addition, the choice effect disappeared
when participants experienced autonomy deprivation. In the
perceived choice-preference link, people’s favorability on the
self-chosen objects in the state autonomy fulfillment condition
remains as high as in the control condition, whereas this
TABLE 5 | The hierarchical regression of predictors on choice effect in Study 2.
Predictor The d-RT in IAT
95% CI (Confidence interval) R R2 1R2 F p β SE p
Model 1 0.136 0.019 0.019 1.174 0.283
Gender [−0.388 0.115] −0.136 0.126 0.283
Model 2 0.285 0.081 0.063 4.157 0.046
Gender [−0.323, 0.185] −0.069 0.127 0.590
Age [0.005, 0.513] 0.259∗ 0.127 0.046
Model 3 0.435 0.190 0.108∗∗ 8.025∗∗ 0.006
Gender [−0.332, 0.151] −0.091 0.121 0.455
Age [0.012, 0.493] 0.253∗ 0.110 0.040
Autonomy Priming [0.097, 0.563] 0.330∗∗ 0.116 0.006
N = 64. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 524
fpsyg-07-00524 April 15, 2016 Time: 15:26 # 9
Shang et al. Autonomy and Choice Effect
favorability would be weakened and would even disappeared
if they experienced autonomy deprivation. The evidence that
trait autonomy is positively correlated with the choice effect is
consistent with this finding. In a word, autonomy moderated
the relationship between the perceived choice and the induced
preference.
The mere exercise of choice itself is assumed to provide
a sense of autonomy (e.g., Iyengar and Lepper, 1999). People
evaluate the chosen alternative as more desirable than the rejected
alternative, in order to reassert their autonomy (Hammock
and Brehm, 1966). The sense of autonomy, which has been
treated as the expression or a result of actual choosing behavior,
fulfills important psychological functions, such as enhancing
happiness (Chekola, 2007; Demir et al., 2011) and increasing
subjective well-being (Sheldon et al., 2004). Thus, people
perceiving choice may experience the sense of autonomy, which
will generate a positive feeling on the self-chosen objects,
and that in turn will enhance the evaluation of the objects.
Experiencing autonomy, which makes people feel free to act their
own decisions, would improve individuals’ feeling of the self-
image. Besides, compared to those in who were merely aware
of the choice, individuals who were primed with autonomy
fulfillment displayed only a relatively, but not significantly
larger trend in choice induced preference, because merely
perceiving the choice could elicit the autonomy experience.
The beforehand autonomy priming only contributes a little bit
more on the basis of the autonomy experience induced by the
choice.
One thing that needs to be pointed out in our objects
evaluation IAT task is that participants were given the
choosership and assigned to specific objects. That is, the perceived
choice assigned to participants was not actually based on their
free will. The autonomy induced by mere choice may be weaker
than that induced by actual choice. Assuming that one’s trait
autonomy is stable, although the subsequent object evaluation
task may elicit autonomy, this level could be canceled out by
the previously primed autonomy deprivation. When the sense
of autonomy has been deprived, one’s intrinsic motivation and
sense of control decreases (Zuckerman et al., 1978; Simon and
McCarthy, 1982, Unpublished), and that generate a negative
feeling on self-chosen objects, which in turn impairs the object-
evaluation.
Taken together, this study found new evidence to explain the
mechanism of the choice effect. That is, the sense of autonomy
affects the choice effect, in other words, experiencing autonomy
moderated the choice-preference link.
Although our study tapped on the mechanism underlying
choice-induced preferences, the results still bear on some
limitations. First, we did not directly test the positive and
negative attitude on the self-chosen and the other-chosen objects
separately. We just combined the attitudes to the positive-self-
chosen objects with that to the negative-other-chosen ones, and
the attitudes to the negative-self-chosen objects with that to
the positive-other-chosen ones. In the future study, we could
separate them and measure the attitude to one’s positively or
negatively described objects separately by recording the real-
time brain activities, which could also provide an implicit way
measuring the attitude. Second, we did not record participants’
explicit preference on objects, but only used the implicit attitudes
as our indicator of preference. Although attitude on objects
was evaluated in an implicit way by an IAT, which has the
advantage of being immune to demanding characteristics and
social desirability, it is necessary to replicate our findings using
other explicit paradigm to confirm that the result can be
generated in different kinds of situations. Third, we used the
scenario in which participants were told which objects they have
chosen, but not the actual choice action. A previous related
study (Huang et al., 2009) using the same paradigm provided
the evidence on the existence of a mere choice effect. Although
this previous study has already verified that the virtual choice
has the same efficacy as the actual choice. To be more carefully
considered, we have to admit that the possible explanation is
the vignette format. To fully verify the robust relationship of
autonomy and choice effect, future research should investigate
whether or not the actual choice actions provide a stronger
relationship than that in the assigned choice. The relationship of
autonomy deprivation and choice effect would be strengthened
in the actual choice actions rather than assigned choice settings
because of the more efforts in actions.
The findings of the current research reveal that autonomy
affects the mere choice effect: (1) individual’s autonomy trait
is positively correlated with the mere choice effect; (2) the
experience of autonomy deprivation decreases the mere choice
effect, which results in that people do not valuate self-chosen
objects more favorably than other-chosen objects anymore. Our
research provides good insights in the relationship between
autonomy and the mere choice effect, and contributes to the
theoretical understanding of the mechanism in choice-induced
preferences.
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